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Establishing a New Stock Market for
Shareholder Value Oriented Firms in Korea
StephenJ. Choi and Kon Sik Kim'"

I. INTRODUCTION

Regulators seeking to strengthen and promote Korea's capital markets face
several challenges in the upcoming century. Although the trading volume and number
of listed companies on the Korea Stock Exchange ("KSE") have grown rapidly over
the past decade, the Composite Stock Price Index ("KOSPI") of total stock market
value has, in fact, fallen. Individual investors inside Korea often choose to invest
primarily in savings deposits, rather than place their money in the equity of listed
companies. Korean investors may have good reasons for avoiding equity investments.
Many of the largest Korean-listed companies are members of conglomerate groups

("cbaebol"). Although the Chairmen and founding families of cbaebol often own a
dwindling minority ownership stake, they typically maintain firm control over all
member firms through cross shareholding arrangements,2 and the private benefits of
control are large in Korea.3
*
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Professor, Seoul National University School of Law. Thanks for helpful comments from Andrew
Guzman, Un Kyung Park, and the participants of the Second Asia Corporate Governance
Conference Program (Seoul, Korea 2002) sponsored by the Asian Institute of Corporate
Governance (and Jack Coffee, our conference commentator).
Bank of Korea, Financial Assets and Liabilities Outstanding [2000], available online at
<htrp://vww.bokor.kr/bokis/bokis/m-matrixcode=D&icurrent=00000186&i-lan=eng>
(visited Sept 21, 2002) (In 2000, stocks accounted for less than seven percent of the financial assets
held by individual Koreans, while deposits at banks and other financial institutions accounted for
more than fifty percent.).
See Daehong T. Jaang, et al, Cross Sbarebolding and Corporate Financial Policy: the Case of Korea 2,
AICG Working Paper (2002), available online at <htp://biz.korea.ac.kr/-aicg/paper._2nd/
Cross.shareholding_.and.corporate._financial.pdf> (visited Sept 20, 2002).
See Yoo Cheong-mo, Corporations Urged to Raise Governance, Transparency Experiments Still Underway
with Outside Director, Class Action Suit, CorporateSplit, Holding Company Systems, Korea Herald (May
29, 2002) ("In a controversial deal, LG Chemical sold 19.75 million shares in LG Petrochemical to
the family of LG Group Chairman Koo Bon-Moo for 5,500 won per share prior to the firm's listing
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As a means of improving capital market liquidity, and in response to the 1997
Asian economic crisis, regulators in Korea moved to strengthen corporate governance
protection for minority investors. There is reason for at least limited optimism on the
effectiveness of such reforms. Legal reform can have an impact on investors and
financial markets. The passage of the federal securities laws and the establishment of
the SEC during the Great Depression in the United States helped to restore
confidence in the markets; as some commentators have put it, the "law matters."
The observation that the law matters is only a starting point, however. The more
salient issue is how to generate good law. While changing the formal legal regime may
have some impact, overall legality depends not only on formal laws but also on public
institutions, private actors, and the background norms that support the law. Indeed,
the law itself may have only marginal significance. Culture, for example, may play a
larger role in determining the extent to which controlling shareholders and managers
expropriate value from minority investors.6
Norms and institutions, of course, are not impervious to change. Commentators,
for example, have called for student exchanges and the establishment of US-style
business and law schools in other countries, as a means of altering the background
environment in which laws operate.7 However, such methods, even if effective, may
take years to generate any noticeable effect. The challenge this paper addresses is how
to implement effective reform to protect investors within Korea, leading to a stronger,
more vibrant capital market in a shorter time frame.
The question of how to protect investors is particularly salient in Korea.
Although the post-1997 crisis reforms have generally enjoyed public support,
governmental interest in undertaking further reforms now seems on the wane.
Meanwhile, the voice of the business establishment denouncing the reform efforts is
gaining in power, blocking or compromising serious reform proposals s
Rather than pursue conventional (and we contend often ineffective) efforts at
reform, we propose a different course. We believe that introducing more competition
in the provision of investor protection may prove to be a more effective route toward

4.
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in 1999 and bought back 6.32 million shares for 15,000 won apiece April 25 this year, bringing at
least 60 billion won in capital gains to the owner family.").
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market
Failure,25 J Corp L 1, 1-2 (1999) (coining the term "law matters").
See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditionsfor Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L
Rev 781, 790-803, 807-15 (2001).
See Amir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt, and Shalom H. Schwartz, Culture, Law, and Finance:
Cultural Dinensions of Corporate Governance Laws, SSRN Working Paper (2001), available online at
<hrtp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm.abstract_id=277613> (visited Sept 20, 2002).
Black, 48 UCLA L Rev at 848 (cited in note 5).
See Yoo Cheong-mo, Cbaebol Callfor an End to State Meddling in Corporate Governance, Korea Herald
(Apr 21, 2000).
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reform. Competition among regulators will provide an incentive to regulators
interested in expanding the scope of their regulatory authority and generating listing
fees to tailor their regulations toward what issuers-and indirectly, investors-desire.
Shifting toward a more competitive regulatory system may require the expenditure of
scarce political capital; nevertheless, once the shift has occurred, a system of regulatory
competition is self-supporting, providing strong incentives for regulatory innovation
into the future.
Of course, the mere fact that competition is effective at generating change is not
enough to favor a competitive system. Change may lead regulatory systems to a "race
to the bottom" as regimes compete with one another to cater to opportunistic
managers Once placed under competitive pressures, regulators may also ignore
external effects on third parties, as well as the benefits of market-wide standardization.
While we do not think the dangers are great, we are mindful of the risks." In addition,
a shift toward a more competitive regulatory system may generate substantial
opposition from large political and business groups that benefit from the present
regulatory regime.
Our proposal in Korea therefore is to start small. We focus on the possibility of
introducing more competition by giving firms greater choice within the existing
regulatory regime. As an initial, obtainable goal, we propose taking an approach
similar to that pursued by the Brazilian Stock Exchange ("Bovespa") to establish a
new voluntary section for firms on the KSE satisfying global corporate governance
standards. We also explore a second option to introduce competition by allowing
some firms to opt out of domestic regulation in favor of the regulatory regime of a
foreign country. Such an approach would allow firms the ability to choose for
themselves-within limits-the level of investor protection they desire through a
listing on a foreign exchange. Firms with large, entrenched controlling shareholders or
managers and a dispersed pool of minority investors will probably not take advantage
of the ability to opt into a higher level of corporate governance, because controlling
shareholders will not voluntarily forsake their private benefits of control. Moreover,
dispersed shareholders already receive compensation for the expected expropriation of
private benefits in the form of a discounted share price at purchase. Instead, our
suggested reforms will primarily assist newer companies seeking to raise funds from

9.

10.

See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation:The Desirable Limits on State Competition in
CorporateLaw, 105 Harv L Rev 1435, 1445 (1992) (summarizing the "race to the bottom" theory
espoused by William Cary and others).
Empirical evidence from state competition for corporate charters provides some support for the
alternative "race to the top" hypothesis. For a review of the empirical literature, see Roberta

Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 Yale LJ 2359, 2383-88
(1998).
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the public capital markets, Indirectly, the creation of a new investor-protection
environment with accompanying norms and institutions will impact the rest of
Korea's capital markets.
In the discussion that follows, part II provides an overview of the potential
benefits from protecting minority investors and the empirical evidence of the efficacy
of such protection. Part III surveys potential reform options and details our proposal
to expand the choices available to companies within the KSE.
II. PROTECTING MINORITY INVESTORS IN KOREA
The KSE handled 473 million shares of daily trading volume in 2001-up from
only 14 million shares of daily trading volume in 1991.12 Since 1997, the KSE trading
system has been fully computerized, thus enabling greater trading activity. 3 Despite
the increase in trading volume and activity on the KSE, many Korean individual
investors continue to avoid the Korean equity markets. When at least partially
protected from the risk of opportunistic managers and controlling shareholders,
minority investors may gain confidence in the market, leading them to invest more
funds. Section A of this part discusses the theoretical need for regulation to protect
minority investors. Section B then canvasses aspects of Korea's investor protection
regime.
A. THE THEORY OF INVESTOR PROTECTION
Information on a firm's confidential projects, cash flows, capital expenditures,
and similar items are often known (at least for a time) solely by the firm's managers
and controlling shareholders. Managers and controlling shareholders with an
informational advantage may attempt to sell overvalued securities to the market or
engage in insider trading.
Faced with the prospect of losing money due to either lack of information or
managerial opportunism, investors may adjust their behavior. In particular, securities
investors may choose to either exit the capital markets, decreasing liquidity, or
demand a discount as compensation for the risks they face. Where investors are
rational and informed on the magnitude of expropriation risk they face, they will on
average accurately discount securities prices to take this risk into account.
Entrepreneurs that suffer an unduly high discount, due to the risks facing uninformed
11.
12.

13.

Nonetheless, even among more established firms, a small, yet growing, number of firms under
professional management may be interested in moving into a more advanced section of the KSE.
Compare <http://www.kse.or.kr/eng/stat/pasr/daily(1991).txt> (listing daily trading volume data
for 1991), with <http://www.kse.or.kr/eng/srar/pasr/daily(2001).txt> (listing daily trading volume
data for 2001) (visited Sept 20, 2002).
See
Korea Stock
Exchange, KSE Fact Book 2000
13, available
online at
<http://www.kse.or.kr/eng/intr/intr-bookol.htm> (visited Sept 20, 2002).
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investors in the market, may then have an incentive at the time they sell their
securities to implement contract-based forms of investor protection. A higher level of
investor protection results in a reduction in the discount demanded by investors,
thereby providing greater offering proceeds for entrepreneurs.'
Despite the possibility of a contractual response, regulations may be better suited
to help alleviate the problem of asymmetric information facing investors. Regulations
may involve greater economies of scale, thus assisting in the detection of violations of
disclosure provisions or opportunistic acts of self-dealing. Not all investors, moreover,
are sophisticated. Less sophisticated investors may fail to discount properly for all the
informational and opportunism risks. Benefits may also exist from standardizationfor example, in disclosure-that individual firms may ignore in their decision on
which investor protection measures to provide through contract. Disclosure may also
generate positive externalities that benefit tnrelated third parties. When one firm
discloses information on its production, for example, the disclosures provide benefits
for competing firms not internalized by the disclosing firm.
Weighed against the positive benefits of regulation, however, are the possible
negative consequences of relying too heavily on mandatory regulation. Once
regulations become mandatory, the possibility exists for regulatory capture."
Moreover, regulators may have an incentive to maximize the size and importance of
their own agency at the expense of social welfare. More perniciously, regulators-to
the extent they are insulated from market pressures-have few incentives to innovate
and develop regulations designed to meet the needs of an ever-changing marketplace.
At the very least, without the discipline of the market, regulators may make mistakes
and not necessarily generate regulations designed to maximize social welfare.
B. EVIDENCE FROM KOREA
In recent years, scholars have produced a number of cross-country empirical
studies assessing the value of legal regimes that provide strong protection of minority
investors. Compared with countries of common law origin (such as the United States
and the United Kingdom), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
("LLSV") provide evidence across a series of articles that the relatively weak investor
protection of Korea (and other civil law countries) correlates with more concentrated

14.

15.

See Bernard S. Black, HasungJang, and Woochan Kim, Does Corporate Governance Matter?: Evidence
from the Korean Market, KDI Working Paper No 02-04 (2002), available online at
<http://www.kdischool.ac.kr/library/w2OO2.htm> (visited Sept 16, 2002) (providing evidence that
greater corporate governance protection for firms listed on the KSE result in a higher measure of
valuation).
For a public choice critique of the SEC in the United States, see Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative
Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Fornation:A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 Cardozo L Rev
909,913-14 (1994).
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ownership, a smaller external financing market, and reduced stock market valuations. 16
One initial criticism of the LLSV studies is that the various indices they use as a proxy
for the level of minority investor protection are flawed. LLSV's direct measure of the
level of formal legal protection for minority equity investors, for example, turns in part
on the presence (or absence) of the right to mail in a proxy vote, the availability of
(optional) cumulative voting, and the presence of preemptive rights to purchase new
issues for preexisting shareholders. Significantly, LLSV ignore the presence of

antitakeover laws or the permissibility of the use of private antitakeover techniques,
including poison pills." It is also unclear how many large publicly-held companies
actually adopt cumulative voting policies when optional.
Focusing more directly on the legal environment within Korea, nonetheless,
provides corroborative evidence that the Korean investor protection regime indeed is
lagging behind other countries, most notably the United States. Prior to the 1997
crisis, the Korean corporate governance regime differed from the United States along
a number of dimensions' First, the ownership structure in Korea was markedly
different. For most large business firms, a control block was typically in the hands of
the founding family, which dominated the internal decisionmaking process. With no
independent directors, the board of directors of Korean firms often acted as a mere
formality. While Korean law provided for a statutory auditor expected to restrain the
misconduct of management, such auditors were largely ineffective. Second, fiduciary
duty rules in Korea were neither well established nor well utilized due to barriers to
derivative suits. Disgruntled shareholders could file a derivative action only if they
owned at least 5 percent of the shares.' 9 Coupled with a lack of class action suits in
Korea, the large threshold share ownership requirement severely curtailed the ability
of shareholders to enforce their rights against management. Third, the market for
corporate control was largely absent in the Korean marketplace, leaving controlling
shareholders largely free from market pressures.

16.

17.

18.
19.

See Rafael La Porta, et al, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J Fin 1131 (1997); Rafael La
Porta, et al, Law and Finance, 106 J Pol Econ 1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes, and Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J Fin 471 (1999); Rafael La
Porra, et al, Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, NBER Working Paper No W7403 (1999),
available online at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn.abstractid=227583> (visited Sept 20,
2002).
See also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the
Separationof Ownership and Control, 111 Yale LJ 1; 4 n 6 (2001) ("By no means is it here implied that
[LLSV's measured] rights are unimportant, but they seem to supply only partial and sometimes
easily outflanked safeguards, which have little to do with the protection of control and the
entitlement to a control premium.").
See Kon Sik Kim, Chaebol and Corporate Governance in Korea (1995) (unpublished PhD dissertation,
University of Washington) (on file with the University of Washington library).
The 5 percent threshold requirement, moreover, was applicable to other shareholder rights.
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While the corporate governance regime in Korea had come under some pressure
for reform prior to 1997, it was the 1997 crisis that dramatically changed the existing
corporate governance environment. A consequence of the crisis was a sudden rise of
foreign investors. Today, more than 30 percent of the shares of listed firms are in the
hands of sophisticated and demanding foreign investors who tend to concentrate on a
small number of blue chip companies. Also, domestic investors, both individual and
institutional, have become far more conscious of the concept of shareholder value.
Although the founding families of the cbaebol companies still enjoy effective control
through complicated cross-ownership, controlling shareholders are now much more
subject to pressures from other shareholders.
The most striking of the post-1997 reforms is a series of statutory reforms
enacted to strengthen shareholder rights. The reforms were largely due to pressure
from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. We point out some of
the most conspicuous changes. 20 First, outside directors are required for listed firms.
For large listed firms, an audit committee is required, instead of a nominal statutory
auditor. The burdensome 5 percent threshold share ownership requirement for
bringing a derivative suit or exercising other shareholder-related rights has been
substantially moderated. For example, the share ownership required for derivative
suits is now down to 1 percent, and 0.01 percent for KSE-listed firms. 21 Board
approval and public disclosure are required for certain related party transactions
involving large listed firms.' Intra-group guarantees are prohibited and existing
guarantees have been eliminated for certain large business groups. 23 Accounting
standards were revised to bring them into substantial compliance with International
Accounting Standards. Large cbaebol groups are now required to prepare "combined"
financial statements covering all the member companies in the group.24 Listed firms
are required to file quarterly reports in addition to annual and biannual reports.25

20.

For a more extensive survey of the reforms, see Hwa-Jin Kim, Toward the "Best Practice"Model in a

Globalizing Market: Recent Developments in Korean Corporate Governance, SSRN Working Paper

21.

22.
23.
24.
25.

(2001), available online at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfinabstract._id=282051> (visited
Sept 20, 2002) (describing changes in Korean corporate governance and Korean governance
adaptation to global standards by analyzing data from 2000 and 2001).
Securities and Exchange Act, art 191-13, § 1 (S Korea), available online at
<http://www.moleg.go.kr/mlawinfo/english/htms/html/lawl9.html> (visited Sept 20, 2002);
Commercial Act, art 403, § 1 (S Korea), available online at <http://www.moleg.go.kr/
mlawinfo/english/htms/html/law08.html> (visited Sept 20, 2002).
Securities and Exchange Act, art 191-19 (cited in note 21).
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, art 10-2 (S Korea), available online at
<http://www.moleg.go.kr/mawinfo/english/htms/html/lawlO.html> (visited Sept 20, 2002).
Act on External Audit of Stock Companies, art 1-2 (S Korea), available online at
<hrtp://www.moleg.go.kr/mlawinfo/english/hrms/html/lawO9.html> (visited Sept 20, 2002).
Securities and Exchange Act, art 186-3 (cited in note 21).
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Despite these formal legal changes, substantial doubt exists as to whether the
reforms will result in a major increase in protection for minority investors in Korea.
The reforms have done little to shore up the confidence of the international
investment community. Moreover, evidence exists that political pressures-primarily
from the cbaebol-are working to undo the reforms.' Given the rapid decline of
willpower in the current government and the heightened voice of the united business
community, it now seems that further statutory change strengthening shareholder
rights is unlikely.

III. REFORM OPTIONS FOR KOREA
With unlimited political resolve, a country interested in reforming its corporate
governance system-defined broadly to include not only formal laws but institutions
and norms-enjoys the luxury of being able to make several attempts at legal reform.
Moreover, the country may attempt to implement reforms incrementally. But political
resolve, unfortunately, is limited. As we move away from the 1997 crisis, the impetus
for reform will most likely decline even further. Given the reality of limited political
capital for reform, we pose the question of what types of reform may prove efficacious
over the long term in Korea.
Most commentators take a traditional approach toward reform in Korea,
advocating top-down changes in corporate governance regulations applying to all
firms.' As we discuss in section A, however, we remain skeptical of this approach
within Korea. At the opposite extreme, one could imagine simply allowing the market
to determine the level of investor protection, possibly through private contract. While

we discuss this possibility in section B, we remain cautious of such a radical change
within Korea's political and economic framework. Instead, section C presents our
proposal for encouraging limited choice within the context of the Korea Stock
Exchange.

26.

27.
28.

See Yoo Cheong-mo, Poll Says Conglomerates' Boards Swayed by Owners, Korea Herald (Jan 16, 2002)
("According to a poll of 171 fund managers in Korea by the Seoul-based Hangil Research, 92.4
percent said that the chaebol's board members are incapable of making independent decisions under
the influence of the largest shareholders or top executives.").
See Yoo, Cbaebol Callfor an End to State Meddling in CorporateGovernance, Korea Herald (cited in note
8) (reporting on Chaebol resistance to corporate governance reforms in Korea).
See Bernard Black, et al, Corporate Governance in Korea at the Millennium: Enhancing International
Competitiveness, 26 J Corp L 537, 560-608 (2001) (proposing a number of reforms to Korea's
Commercial Code focusing on strengthening the role of the board of directors, and the ability of
shareholders to approve certain transactions, among other measures).
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A. ToP-DOWN GOVERNMENT REGULATION
In attempting top-down corporate governance reforms, Korea is not alone. Many
countries throughout the 1990s instituted reforms affecting governance within firms.
Despite the success of the United States capital markets (and economy) and the belief
held by many that the US system of strong investor protection is at least partially
responsible for such success, major questions exist as to whether importing US-style
laws will provide similar results for other countries. Formal legal rules represent only a
part (and perhaps not even the most important part) of the overall investor protection
regime. Without effective public institutions, including an unbiased judiciary and
regulatory enforcement officials, and similarly effective private institutions, including
reputational intermediaries able to protect the interests of unsophisticated investors in
the market, formal legal rules may offer little real protection for investors.'
Evidence exists supporting the view that mere formal changes in the law often
prove ineffective in transforming practices within a country. In large part due to
efforts on the part of the SEC, for example, many countries adopted formal
prohibitions against insider trading in the 1980s and 1 9 9 0 sw Despite the presence of a
formal ban on insider trading, however, few countries have ever engaged in
enforcement of this ban.3' At the end of 1998, 103 countries had stock markets, 87 of
those countries prohibited insider trading, but enforcement had taken place at least
32
once in only 38 countries.
Korea's experience fits well with these propositions. For example, fiduciary rules
in the Korean Commercial Code, although not as comprehensive as their US
counterparts, were first adopted forty years ago in 1962. Nonetheless, until recently
enforcement of the rules was rare due to, among other reasons, the 5 percent share
ownership requirement to initiate a derivative suit. The operation of the board of
directors in Korea serves as another example. Before the economic crisis, the board
was a mere formality except in a small number of joint venture firms or governmentowned enterprises. Directors were widely regarded as executives in the corporate
hierarchy and not as members of an organ in charge of monitoring corporate

29.
30.
31.

32.

For a discussion of laws and institutions (arguably) important for the development of strong
securities markets, see Black, 48 UCLA L Rev 781 (cited in note 5).
See Harvey L. Pitt and David B. Hardison, Gaines Without Frontiers: Trends in the International
Response to Insider Trading,55 L & Contemp Probs 199, 204-06 (1992).
See Utpal Bhattacharya and Hazem Daouk, The World Priceof InsiderTrading,57 J Fin 75, 75 (2002)
(prior to 1990, only nine of thirty-four countries with prohibitions on insider trading ever engaged
in an enforcement action).
Id. See also Katharina Pistor, Martin Raiser, and Stanislav Gelfer, Law and Finance in Transition
Economies 2, EBRD Working Paper No 48 (2000), available online at <http://www.ebrd.com/
pubs/econ/workingp/48.pdf> (visited Sept 22, 2002) ("legal environment is much more important
than formal legal protection).
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decisionmaking. Large companies, such as Samsung Electronics, had up to sixty
directors, yet board meetings often took place only on the books.
Of course, new legal rules often have an impact on the underlying norms and
institutions within a country. Within the United States, the passage of federal
securities laws during the 1930s dramatically changed how companies offer securities
and provide information to the marketplace. Of significance is the fact that the
passage of federal securities laws closely followed the stock market crash of 1929 and
occurred while the public held a widespread belief that fraud and market
manipulation led to the crash."
Despite the effectiveness of some scandal-driven law reform, two problems exist
with relying on scandals as a catalyst for reform. First, lawmakers in the wake of a
scandal may overreact in implementing new far-reaching regulatory reform. Once
reforms are in place, it may take decades to remove the legal changes. For example, the
United States only recently removed barriers under Glass-Steagall, which kept the
businesses of commercial banks and securities firms separate.' Second, when scandals
are absent, the political capital for reform may diminish rapidly. Relying solely on
lawmakers to generate new investor protection measures may therefore result in either
too strident new regulations, or too few changes to the regulatory regime.
The Korean experience with corporate governance reform fits the pattern of
scandal-driven reform. After the Asian economic crisis, numerous corporate
governance reforms took place. Now, several years after the reforms, the prospect of
future reform efforts appears dim at best. Rather than wait for another scandal,
regulators may wish to consider reforms to the process of how regulations are created,
in order to provide an ongoing and persistent level of impetus for reforms that benefit
investors.
B. PRIVATE CONTRACT
Where regulation fails to provide necessary investor protection measures, market
participants may turn to substitute mechanisms of protecting the interests of minority
investors. The market, of course, will not choose to adopt all possible types of
protection. Some forms of protection, for example, are simply not cost-effective. It
may be the case that forcing a full-blown audit of a corporation's business on a daily
basis may deter hidden forms of self-dealing and fraud-but the costs of conducting
such a daily audit far outweigh the expected benefits from doing so. When protective
measures are cost-effective, participants in the market will have strong incentives to

33.
34.

See generally Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation?: 300 Years of Evidence, 75 Wash U
L Q849, 850 (1997) (observing that significant legal changes often occur following major scandals).
See Michael Schroeder, Clinton Signs Financial-Services Bill, But Cautions About Privacy Shortfalls, Wall
StJ A41 (Nov 15, 1999).
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adopt such measures. When investors are protected, they will pay more for securities
up front, raising the value of the offering proceeds for the initial promoters.
What are the possible substitute mechanisms available in Korea? Companies
may use contractual means to protect investors. A firm, for example, may adopt
provisions in its articles of incorporation. Provisions may require a majority of outside
directors on the board of directors or the approval of outside directors for self-dealing
transactions involving controlling shareholders. Nevertheless, some residual
uncertainty exists as to what extent Korea's Commercial Code in fact gives firms the
ability to bind themselves through the corporate charter.
Even without resorting to private contract, firms seeking to protect minority
investors may attempt to associate with market-based reputational intermediaries.
Investors, of course, may not have the ability to distinguish among different
intermediaries, allowing lower level intermediaries to free ride off the reputation of
higher quality intermediaries.s Free riding in turn, may lead higher quality
intermediaries to reduce their own investment in quality. On the other hand, many
high quality intermediaries are well known to Korean investors. It is unclear, for
example, the extent to which investors will fail to distinguish between the Goldman
Sachses and Morgan Stanleys of the market and lesser-known firms.
Firms may also choose to engage in voluntary disclosures to benefit their
investors. Empirical studies show that companies that list on securities exchanges in
more than one country tend to disclose a significant amount of information
voluntarily.
Private contract nevertheless has its limits. Private actors may ignore the external
impact of their decisions on other parties not related through contract to the actors.
Firms choosing the level of information to disclose to the market, for example, may
ignore the positive benefit from such disclosures to third parties who value more
accurate securities prices. Dispersed shareholders are at risk that managers may
engage in a "mid-stream" shift, changing the level of investor protection well after
investors have put money into a firm.
The government may also enjoy a comparative advantage in providing some
forms of investor protection. Governments may employ criminal penalties, while
private parties may not. Regulatory agencies may also enjoy economies of scale in
enforcing existing regulations. But the fact that governments enjoy a comparative
advantage does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that government regulation must
be mandatory. As suggested in the next section, regulators could achieve the same

35.
36.

See Black, 48 UCLA L Rev at 787-88 (cited in note 5).
See Gary K. Meek, Clare B. Roberts, and Sidney J. Gray, Factors Influencing Voluntary Annual Report
Disclosures By U.S., U.K. and ContinentalEuropean Multinational Corporations, 26 JIntl Bus Stud 555,
566 (1995) ("Listing status is important in explaining voluntary strategic and financial, but not
nonfinancial, disclosures.").
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comparative advantage by creating an optional high corporate governance section of
the stock exchange. 7
Lastly, private contract may bind market participants. Nevertheless, purely
private contract cannot bind the government itself from engaging in expropriating
activities. For example, Russia, through its tax regime, has frequently engaged in
confiscatory behavior. 8
C. EXPANDING CHOICE
Private contract is not the only means to generate choice. A regime where
investors are able to choose from among different regulatory regimes in competition
with one another is possible. Corporations in the United States, for example, choose
their own state of incorporation. Evidence from the state competition for corporate
charters inside the US provides some support for the notion that competition may
lead to a race to the top, benefiting investors. 9 Expanding choice through regulatory
competition may also benefit Korean investors, and thereby the liquidity of the
Korean capital markets. Where the choice is provided through regulatory
competition, issuers and investors will enjoy both the benefits of government-supplied
investor protection as well as the responsiveness and innovation that come from
competition.4
Two considerations, nevertheless, give us pause in recommending too great a
level of choice for the Korean situation. First, government officials within Korea are
accustomed to a large degree of intervention in the financial markets, leading to
potential resistance to moving toward a full choice regime. Second, while evidence
exists that choice may generally work well for state competition for corporate charters
in the US, Korea may pose a different situation. Investors within Korea may lack the
same level of sophistication as US investors. At the very least, Korean investors run
the risk of confusion to the extent companies with different regimes are allowed to
trade concurrently on the KSE. Multiple regimes may also undermine the ability of
investors in Korea to compare companies with one another. Managers may also abuse
the ability to shift regimes, thereby removing the few investor protection measures
Korea presently provides.
37.
38.
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For a discussion of "self-tailored" liability, see Stephen Choi, Market Lessonsfor Gatekeepers, 92 Nw U
L Rev 916, 951-58 (1998).
See Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman, and Anna Tarassova, Russian Privatization and Corporate
Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 Stan L Rev 1731, 1758 (2000).
For evidence on the possibility of a race to the top, see Romano, 107 Yale LJ at 2383-88 (cited in
note 10). For sources providing an exposition of the race to the top argument, see Bebchuk, 105
Harv L Rev at 1445-46 (cited in note 9).
For an argument that issuers and investors should enjoy choice in the form of securities regulation
that applies to their securities transactions, see Stephen J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, Portable
Reciprocity: Rethinking the InternationalReach of SecuritiesRegulation, 71 S Cal L Rev 903, 906-08 (1998).
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Korea therefore faces a dilemma. While a full-blown regulatory competition
choice regime may prove politically infeasible (at least today) and pose a number of
problems, the present top-down approach to regulation is equally problematic.
Without resorting completely to a full choice regime, we contend that more limited
moves to increase the choice available to Korean issuers may obtain many of the
benefits from regulatory competition without incurring the risks related to regulatory
competition and the political costs of shifting toward such a regime. Success in
providing for limited competition may then eventually lead Korea to increasing the
amount of choice.
Little choice exists today for Korean companies seeking to adopt different types
of protection for investors. While some countries allow firms to incorporate in foreign
countries, Korea does not. Under the Commercial Code, a firm incorporated in a
foreign jurisdiction is subject to all the provisions of the Code if it has its head office
or main operations in Korea.4' We propose two alternative methods of increasing
choice in regulatory protection. First, we discuss the possibility of the KSE
implementing a new market specifically for companies that opt into a higher level of
disclosure and investor protection. Second, we discuss the possibility of a new KSE
market for firms that may elect to follow the regulatory regime of another country.
1. Establishing a High Corporate Governance Market
Some ability to opt into a greater level of investor protection already exists for
Korean companies. A Korean firm, for example, may enter into an agreement with a
foreign securities exchange to become listed on the exchange. Korean firms listing on
the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), for example, must meet certain listing
requirements, including a minimum number of shareholders and average trading
volume, and quantitative requirements relating to earnings, cash flow, and global
market capitalization. In addition, the NYSE provides a variety of corporate
governance related listing requirements. Firms that list on the NYSE are also exposed
to US federal securities regulations, including both antifraud and mandatory
disclosure provisions. Listing on the NYSE, along with other global securities
exchanges, therefore demonstrates the management's commitment to transparency.
Significantly, however, exchanges will often waive many of their listing
requirements for qualifying foreign issuers.42 Regulators will also make exceptions for
foreign issuers, which are not available for domestic issuers within the securities
regulatory regime. Even where foreign securities exchanges and regulators attempt to
implement stringent investor protection, enforcement problems exist. Where the
officers and assets of a listed company are located in a different country from an

41.
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See Commercial Act, art 617 (cited in note 21).
Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 54 SMU L Rev 325, 333
(2001).
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exchange, the exchange (and regulatory authorities such as the SEC) may have a
difficult time obtaining information and seeking enforcement.
Evidence nevertheless exists that foreign firms that seek to obtain an exchange
listing (or a listing on NASDAQ) inside the United States come disproportionately
from countries with weak investor protection. 4' Listing on a US exchange, therefore,
may provide substitute forms of investor protection to fill the void left by the laws of
the issuer's home country.
Despite the possibility of listing on an established foreign securities exchange,
establishing a high corporate governance standard market within Korea will provide
several advantages for domestic Korean companies and investors. First, companies
face higher transaction costs when listing overseas. Domestic investors already may be
aware of a company in ways that foreign investors are not. Language translation
problems and the need to deal with foreign counsel also increase the costs of listing
securities overseas. More firms, therefore, may select into a Korean high corporate
governance standard market than would list on a foreign securities exchange. Second,
the KSE may provide investor protection and enforcement at a lower cost due to the
local proximity of Korean companies. Lastly, the KSE may tailor its provision of
investor protection specifically for Korean investors and, moreover, employ corporate
governance devices not presently required on overseas exchanges.
The concept of establishing a new high corporate governance market is not new.
Other securities exchanges have taken the route of actively providing investor
protection as a selling point of their market. The Neuer Markt in Germany, a
subsidiary of the Deutsche Boerse, adopted disclosure and accounting standards on
par with US standards, rather than the laxer German standards.' Over a three-year
period, these stringent forms of investor protection allowed the Neuer Markt to grow
from 2 to 302 listed companies." The value of high corporate governance listing
standards, moreover, is not lost on companies listed on the Neuer Markt. After a
wave of bankruptcies and insider trading scandals involving listed companies, several
of the top companies listed on the Neuer Markt demanded tougher listing
requirements. 46 Based on private contract between the Deutsche Boerse and listing

43.
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See William A. Reese, Jr. and Michael S. Weisbach, Protectionof Minority ShareholderInterests, Crosslistings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings, SSRN Working Paper (2000), available
online at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin abstract-id=194670> (visited Sept 16, 2002).
See Vanessa Fuhrmans, Playing By the Rules: How Neuer Markt Gets Respect, Wall St J C1 (Aug 21,
2000) (noting that the successful Neuer Markt portrays itself as "[tjhe most regulated market" in
Europe). The Neuer Markt was closed down and merged into the Frankfurt Stock Exchange in
September 2002, during the last stage of editing for this article.
See id. Although the Neuer Markt's market capitalization grew rapidly, it has recently experienced
both scandals and a large drop in market capitalization.
See Neal E. Boudette and Alfred Kueppers, Frustrated Neuer Markt Members Push for Tightening
ListingRules, Wall StJ C12 (July 11, 2001).
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companies, the stringent listing requirements of the Neuer Markt are being47duplicated
in growth stock markets located in Amsterdam, Brussels, Paris and Milan.
Similarly, the Bovespa in Brazil established a new section, the Novo Mercado,
for firms with a corporate governance structure that provides strong minority investor
protection. As with the Neuer Markt, the Novo Mercado targets smaller companies
that otherwise would have few options to raise capital (aside from development
banks).43 Such companies include high technology startups as well as closely held
preexisting companies. The Novo Mercado makes both stringent minority investor
protection and US accounting standards part of its listing requirements. Firms listed
on the Novo Mercado, for example, must only issue voting shares and give minority
shareholders the right to appoint members of the supervisory board. 9 The Novo
Mercado requires companies to have at least 25 percent of their equity publiclytraded. After an initial public offering, controlling shareholders must also agree to a
six-month lockup period. To date, the Novo Mercado has signed only two listed
companies. " On the one hand, this small number may indicate that higher corporate
governance standards may fail to attract firms to an otherwise illiquid market.
Nonetheless, even where higher corporate governance standards fail to jumpstart a
market such as the Novo Mercado, such standards may work in countries with larger
overall capital markets such as in the case of Germany and the Neuer Markt.5"
Following the lead of the Neuer Markt and the Novo Mercado, a new section of
the Korea Stock Exchange could set itself up as a leader in investor protection.
Without elaborating on the details here, a high corporate governance section of the
KSE could provide for compliance with US accounting standards or further
reconciliation with the International Accounting Standards. In addition, minority
investor protection could potentially be required of listed firms, and more significantly
enforced under the threat of de-isting.5 2 Significantly, the KSE's optional higher
standards would be imposed through private contract, and only on firms that
voluntarily choose to list on the new market. Implementing higher corporate
governance standards through private contract reduces the need to obtain the
cooperation of the various regulatory agencies that implement other aspects of private
company law in Korea.

47.

See Fuhrmans, PlayingBy the Rules, Wall StJ at C1 (cited in note 44).
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See Craig Karmin, Brazil Prepares Launch of Market to Encourage Foreign Investment Through Good
Governance, Wall StJ C16 (Dec 14,2000).
See id.
See the current list of Novo Mercado companies on the Bovespa web site at
<http://vrww.bovespa.com.br/fra.cialistnmi.htm> (visited Sept 20, 2002).
Furthermore, the Novo Mercado experiment is still too new to critique fairly.
Minority investor protection could potentially include provisions for a majority of outside directors,
independent audit, compensation and nomination committees, cumulative voting, and more
elaborate and strengthened fiduciary rules.
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Not all firms in Korea, of course, will take advantage of a new high corporate
governance market. In particular, preexisting firms where managers and controlling
shareholders already enjoy high levels of private benefits will almost certainly avoid the
high corporate governance market, at least initially. But where a firm has a large value
project that requires additional outside capital, managers may choose to opt for higher
corporate governance standards to reduce their cost of capital. This will occur to the
extent the managers gain more, as shareholders, from the ability to pursue the new
project than they lose in reduced private benefits. Firms lacking such high value new
projects will choose not to adopt the new standards.
The failure on the part of some firms, particularly those firms with a large
preexisting base of minority shareholders, to take advantage of a new high corporate
governance market is not a large problem for our proposal. Minority investors are not
directly harmed to the extent they already paid a large discount when they initially
purchased their shares. To the extent investors did not anticipate the creation of a
high corporate governance market, they would have discounted the shares for the very
likely possibility that managers would expropriate large levels of private benefits.
Indeed, the ability of companies with a large contingent of preexisting minority
shareholders to ignore a new high corporate governance market is precisely what gives
our proposal feasibility. Once large, entrenched business interests are not forced into
our regime, they will have less reason to oppose establishing such a market.
In comparison, we predict that many firms without a large base of preexisting
minority shareholders will elect into a new high corporate governance market. Firms
about to go public for the first time, for example, will receive a lower discount on their
shares-and correspondingly larger offering proceeds-to the extent they elect into
types of protection that investors value. Moreover, the provision of a standardized set
of investor-protection measures through a new market on the KSE alleviates many of
the concerns raised by those opposed to regulatory competition. Because only one
high corporate governance option is offered, investors may easily identify those firms
adopting such a level of investor protection based on their listing on the new market.
Investors, as well, will have the ability to compare disclosures across firms on the new
market, relying on standardization enforced through the higher listing requirements.
The KSE and government regulators behind the KSE may also take into
account positive external benefits from disclosure requirements imposed in the new
market. While easy to state as an abstract matter, it is more difficult to determine
precisely what information investors would not want disclosed given the private costs,
but that third parties in the market would find significant. Roberta Romano has put
forth the argument that even if such information exists, the mandatory disclosure
regime as administered by the SEC in the US fails to take such third-party
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externalities into account. 3 Nevertheless, there is the potential for the KSE to force
firms to make such disclosures in the new market. Of course, some firms on the
margin may find that the additional cost of disclosure outweighs the private benefit
from protecting investors, and will choose therefore to remain outside the new
market. Given the present low level of corporate governance protection for investors
in Korea, the benefit to investors from the new market will likely be significantly
positive and few firms that opt into the market will therefore be on the margin.
Additionally, because the option offered only increases the amount of investor
protection, the danger of managerial opportunism resulting in a further "race to the
bottom" is absent.
Other firms, in addition to firms going public, may voluntarily select into the
new high corporate governance market. Firms that already maintain a culture of
managers looking out for investors may select into the high corporate governance
market, because the already low private benefit levels of the managers are unlikely to
be affected. We predict that at least some current well-established firms under
professional managers, such as banks, POSCO, and recently-privatized firms like
Korea Telecom, may elect initially into the new market.
Over time, the growth of a high governance market will then place competitive
pressure on non-listed firms along a number of dimensions. First, firms listed on the
new market will have strong incentives to maximize share value. One method of doing
so is to hire professional managers focused on maximizing share value. The demand
for professional managers will in turn affect the norms within business schools in
Korea as well as standards of conduct for managers generally, in a much faster way
than simply importing US-style business schools into Korea. Spillover effects on
managers at firms choosing not to list on the KSE new market are therefore possible,
as managers migrate across different firms and the general management culture shifts
in Korea. Firms initially resistant to the new market may then eventually opt into the
market.
Second, domestic investors in new high corporate governance firms will come to
expect a certain level of investor protection. In addition, foreign investors are more
likely to invest in firms that provide more credible investor protection. Such investors
may avoid firms that choose not to list on the new market, reducing the liquidity of
such firms and thereby further depressing the share price of non-listing firms. For
example, foreign investors sold off the shares of companies in the LG Group, resulting
in a large decline in the share prices of the companies, after the controlling family of
the LG Group engaged in an internal stock deal that netted the family $46 million.5
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See Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 Theoretical
Inquiries L 387,446-64 (2001).
See, for example, Yoo Cheong-mo, LG Group's Owner Family Draws Bitter Criticismsfor Dubious Stock
Transactions,Korea Herald (Apr 26, 2002).

Fall2002

ChicagoJournafofInternationa(Law

Investor-oriented institutions already present to a limited degree-including USstyle business schools, sophisticated investment banks, and law firms-will also find
an increased demand for their services, leading to a growth in these institutions within
Korea and a change in the business norms toward investor-protection goals.
To the extent the new market also provides more effective avenues for
shareholder activism, shareholder groups may form to collectivize the interests of
shareholders. Once such groups achieve economies of scale, they may then focus
attention on firms that choose not to list on the exchange. Already in Korea the
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy ("PSPD"),5 a shareholder activist
group, has initiated fiduciary duty-related lawsuits," pushed for the appointment of
outside directors, 7 and openly questioned management decisions at shareholder
meetings.' 8
Third, if the migration to the new section turns out to affect the stock price
favorably, firms remaining in the old section of the KSE will feel strong pressure from
investors to move to the high corporate governance section, thereby accelerating
changes in corporate governance practices.
A possibility exists that present business establishments (including in particular
the cbaebol)-although not directly threatened under the Articles choice-based
proposal-may nonetheless resist an experiment that may lead other firms in Korea
to adopt a higher corporate governance regime. Moreover, despite the various benefits
associated with implementing a new high corporate governance section of the KSE,
we do not foresee the KSE voluntarily implementing such a market without
government approval. Although the growing competition among global stock markets
for capital will ultimately change the incentives placed on the KSE, presently the KSE
enjoys a near monopoly over Korean investors seeking to put money into equity
investments. Within such a monopoly position, the KSE has few incentives to pursue
change. Moreover, officials in charge of the KSE today may care little about the
competitive environment the KSE may encounter in the near future to the extent the
impact primarily falls on future officials at the KSE.
Korea's Ministry of Finance and Economy ("MOFE") may therefore have a role
in establishing the new KSE market and setting standards for listing on the market.
As with all forms of mandatory regulation, the initiation of a new high corporate
governance market may run into problems related to industry capture and non55.
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responsiveness over time on the part of regulators, among others. Significantly,
however, we envision the MOFE's role as important only at the start of the new
market.59 Once the new market gains scale and investor support, further changes to
the new market's listing standards will derive from private initiatives. In particular, we
recommend giving the KSE direct incentives to ensure the listing standards on the
new market continue to cater to the interests of investors. One possible structural
reform would be to make the new market a for-profit subsidiary of the KSE; presently
the KSE is a non-profit membership organization. 6° Alternatively, the MOFE could
have the KSE sell off the new high corporate governance part of the KSE as a separate
for-profit entity, demutualizing the KSE in part.61
Politically, efforts toward demutualization may prove difficult in Korea. The
MOFE may be reluctant to accept a proposal directly compromising its authority.
Nevertheless, even without any explicit domestic effort to alter the incentives of
officials in the new KSE market, the growing globalization of the world capital
markets will eventually generate a large amount of background competitive pressure.
Short-sighted KSE officials may resist initiating a new high corporate governance
market. Nonetheless, future KSE officials, once the market is in place and faced with
growing capital market competition, will have the incentive and ability to cater to the
preferences of investors in the global competitive marketplace while avoiding the
political backlash from entrenched business interests unwilling to part with their
present level of private benefits of control. Such changes, moreover, take time. If the
MOFE promotes these reforms today, the KSE will be better positioned in the near
future to engage in such competition.
In the upcoming global competition between securities markets, relatively
smaller countries may have an advantage in providing protection that investors value.
Delaware "won" the competition for corporate charters perhaps in part because of its
small size. A small state may focus on maximizing the value of its rules for
corporations without fearing the political impact on other constituencies.62 Also, the
fact that incorporation fees represent a large proportion of Delaware's total fiscal
intake helps make credible the implicit promise on the part of Delaware lawmakers to
adjust continually the corporate law rules to maximize corporate welfare. Korea may
59.
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adopt a similar tactic. Through a high corporate governance exchange with credible
enforcement built up over time, the KSE may provide a welcome avenue for both
investors and firms seeking to raise capital.
2. A Dual-Listed Section of the KSE
While establishing a high corporate governance section of the KSE will provide
choice and competition in the provision of investor protection in Korea, the amount
of competition is limited. Within Korea, the competition will be between the
traditional KSE section and the new high corporate governance section. Where the
standard setters for the new high corporate governance section of the KSE do not
capture entirely the benefit from establishing new forms of investor protection, or at
the very least are not separate from the regulators of the traditional section of the
KSE, the level of competition may be small (at least absent global financial market
competition)." As an alternative reform, we therefore suggest creating a new market
within the KSE specifically designated for firms that choose to follow the listing
standards and accounting disclosures of select, alternative foreign regimes.
We imagine that such a system would entail providing automatic listing on the
new dual-listed section of the KSE for any company that lists on any one of several
approved exchanges. The Korean government, for example, could approve the NYSE,
NASDAQ, and the London Stock Exchange ("LSE"), among others, as eligible
markets for firms seeking automatic dual-listing status. Within the dual-listed section
of the KSE, Korean investors may then benefit from more stringent investor
protection, generated through competition among the regimes of foreign markets,
without having to leave the domestic Korean equity market.
While radical, the KSE would not be alone in following such a free-riding
approach toward regulatory competition. Since 2000, the Israeli government has
allowed firms that list in the US securities markets to gain automatic dual-listing
privileges on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.' Firms that dual list in the US and the
Tel Aviv Stock Exchange are exempted from any additional listing or maintenance
requirements as well as listing fees.65 Along a similar vein, the SEC for the past decade
has allowed Canadian firms to raise capital inside the United States while following
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As discussed above, however, global competition from other securities exchanges may nevertheless
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primarily the disclosure (but not the antifraud) rules of Canada under the
multijurisdictional disclosure system.6
Providing for a degree of choice within the new dual-listed section of the KSE
will then generate competitive pressures on the traditional portion of the KSE to
provide investor protection that firms and investors jointly desire. As with the high
corporate governance section, competition will have an effect only if those in charge of
establishing investor protection within the KSE are affected directly. For example, to
the extent volume is drawn off of the traditional KSE and the role for regulators on
the KSE is correspondingly diminished, KSE officials will have at least some incentive
to modify their provision of investor protection to better suit the needs of investors.
Several criticisms are possible against our KSE dual-listed section proposal. First,
a greater possibility for investor confusion may result. In particular, unsophisticated
investors lacking good information may fail to price accurately the selection of a
particular regime. To reduce the possibility of investor confusion, regulators may wish
to restrict access to only more sophisticated investors. Much like Rule 144A in the
United States, the MOFE could establish that the free market section is only
accessible to sophisticated investors. As with Rule 144A, regulators may use brightline numerical criteria based on wealth, income, and invested assets, to determine
which investors qualify as sophisticated. But in contrast to the US securities laws,
Korean regulators may also wish to establish that securities purchased in the free
market section may not be resold to unsophisticated investors, even with the passage
of time from the initial offering by the issuer.
We are agnostic, however, on the need to restrict access to the dual-listed market
only to sophisticated investors. Simply placing the dual-listed status firms in a
separate and readily-identifiable section of the KSE helps reduce the possibility of
investor confusion. Where the firm trades in an efficient market, moreover, the value
of a selected regulatory regime will become incorporated in the market price,
indirectly protecting the interests of unsophisticated investors. Regulators may also
reduce the risk facing unsophisticated investors by limiting the choice of alternative
regulatory regimes, for example, to the NYSE, NASDAQ, and the LSE.
Second, one could question the value of regulatory protection provided by a
foreign source. The NYSE, for example, may lack the information necessary to
enforce its listing requirements against a Korean company. Moreover, obtaining
judgment against Korean nationals and assets located in Korea may be difficult for
both the NYSE and the SEC. United States regulatory officials, as well, may not care
about the impact of their actions on Korean investors, focusing primarily on the
welfare of US investors. The NYSE itself has instituted a lower level of listing
66.
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requirements for foreign firms, perhaps in recognition of the difficulties in obtaining
the compliance of foreign firms with more stringent requirements. 67
Several responses are possible to the problem of enforcement. Korean companies
will have an incentive to select only those regimes that are able to enforce their laws
against Korean companies. Firms that actively opt into the dual-listed market and
select a regime where enforcement is weak will face a large discount from investors.
Moreover, Korea and the KSE do not have to remain passive with regard to
enforcement even in the new dual-listed market. Regulators in Korea may work with
specific countries to provide information and other assistance to reduce the cost of
enforcement for foreign regulators. Korea may also choose to enforce certain
applicable laws of another country. To the extent the US allows for class actions, for
example, Korea may allow Korean investors to pursue class actions against firms that
opt to adopt US standards.'
The lack of norms and institutions geared toward investor protection may limit
the effectiveness of the KSE and the Korean government in providing more stringent
enforcement of investor protection norms, even for firms on the new dual-listed
market that opt into a foreign regime with a higher level of investor protection.
Institutions, nevertheless, may cross international borders. Several prominent US
investment banks-including Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley-have offices in
Seoul. Firms that use the dual-listed market in the KSE to opt into US-style
protection will provide a natural clientele for US-based investment banks and
attorneys familiar with the operation of US listing standards and securities regulation.
Providing a new, optional market removes many of the pressures against reform from
entrenched business interests, leaving newer firms the ability to opt for stronger
investor protection and thereby profit from the corresponding reduced cost of capital.
New norms and institutions may then generate around this core group of firms opting
into the dual-listed market.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Prior to the Asian economic crisis of 1997, Korea experienced rapid growth in
many sectors in its economy. Korea's government played an active role in this growth,
providing subsidies and guaranteed financing for favored business sectors, particularly
heavy industry and chemical manufacturing. One consequence of the Korean
government's heavy-handed intervention into the market was the shift by many large
chaebol companies into often ill-advised debt financing. Ultimately, the large levels of
67.
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debt, and in particular foreign debt, put the cbaebol companies in a precarious financial
state and accelerated the foreign exchange depletion leading to the 1997 crisis.
Throughout the buildup of debt financing, the needs of minority equity
shareholders in Korean companies were often simply ignored. Founding families of
the cbaebol companies enjoyed absolute control of their connected business empires
through interlocking share positions. Of course, where minority investors were able to
demand a discount in the share price, they were not directly harmed from the high
private benefits. Nevertheless, the lack of protection for minority equity investors
made it more difficult for new startup companies to obtain financing. Moreover, in
today's post-Asian economic crisis world, even the cbaebol companies can no longer
look exclusively to debt financing.
Changing the level of a country's investor protection, however, is not an easy
assignment. Top-down reform may prove ineffective and the impetus for change may
gradually dissipate. Not only may deep-rooted norms and institutional barriers exist,
but also-perhaps more significantly-specific interest groups in society may actively
push against change. Controlling founders of cbaebol, for example, will not easily
relinquish their private benefits of control.
Rather than press for reforms that affect all Korean companies, therefore, we
choose to start out on a smaller scale, recommending that the KSE establish a new
section of the market for firms that choose to opt into a higher level of protection for
investors compared to the present Korean regime. Modest efforts at introducing some
amount of choice, and thereby competition, in the provision of regulatory protection
within the Korean Stock Exchange may provide the most promising and feasible first
step toward improving investor protection.
Establishing a new section of the KSE has the added benefit of potentially
increasing the amount of competitive pressure placed on regulators of the remaining
sections of the KSE. Significantly, explicit moves to increase the incentives of the KSE
to develop value-maximizing investor protection devices may not be necessary. Even
without explicit incentives, competition will eventually arrive in Korea through the
growing integration of the global capital markets. To the extent Korean investors are
increasingly able to invest their funds overseas, the KSE will lose volume if it does not
provide the types of protection that investors desire. Establishing a separate high
corporate governance section allows the KSE the freedom to engage in competition
for investors' dollars without facing the political constraints imposed by preexisting
controlling blocks in companies with high levels of private benefits.
Competition may also occur to the extent Korea establishes a new dual-listed
market in the KSE on which issuers may automatically list after complying with the
listing standards of one of a group of select foreign securities exchanges. The new
dual-listed market thus enables Korean investors to invest in domestic securities,
while benefiting from regulatory competition between different global securities
exchanges. Moreover, the KSE may supplement the enforcement of foreign exchange
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listing provisions within Korea to increase the value to Korean investors of having a
Korean firm select the protection provided in a foreign jurisdiction.
Ultimately, we care most about establishing a competitive environment that
provides some degree of ongoing choice and competition in the forms of investor
protection provided through the KSE. With the limited political capital remaining
after the Asian economic crisis, directing current reform efforts toward the realistic
goal of establishing a limited competitive regulatory system may generate more
valuable future reforms. A competitive regulatory system, once established, will
provide the impetus for the development of institutions and norms in support of a
strong investor protection regime.
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